We characterize two sorts of stochastic choice rules in which the agent makes current decisions using a forward-looking value function that takes future randomizations into account. Both sorts of rules generalize logistic choice, and are equivalent to it in static problems. The rules di↵er in how the agent views future choice sets and how he views his future randomizations. One rule is equivalent to the discounted logit used in applied work, and exhibits a "preference for flexibility;" the other is "error-averse" and penalizes the addition of undesirable choices to a menu.
Introduction
Observed individual choice is typically stochastic. Most of the theoretical literature on stochastic choice has focused on static models, though dynamic random utility models are commonly used in estimation and much of modern economics emphasizes dynamic choice.
This paper provides the first characterization of stochastic choice in a dynamic setting, where choices made today can influence the possible choices available tomorrow. The models we consider are recursive, in the sense that the agent's choice in each period is made taking into account the continuation value of the future problem, where this continuation value incorporates the agent's awareness that he will choose randomly in the future. We focus on two sorts of choice rules that have many properties in common; in particular, they both coincide with the logit model in static problems. The extra information provided by the agent's choices between future menus lets us distinguish between the two rules; in particular the two choice rules correspond to di↵erent relationships between the agent's choice of a menu of future outcomes in some period t and the choice from that menu in period t + 1.
Under one rule the agent has a "preference for flexibility" in the sense of preferring larger choice sets, as in Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) . In particular the agent prefers to add utility-equivalent items to a menu, which we call "variety loving." One of the representations of this preference supposes that stochastic choice arises from privately observed payo↵ shocks: Here adding items to a menu cannot hurt the agent, as even an item that is ex ante unlikely to be optimal will only be chosen if it turns out to be the best choice. An alternative representation suggests that the agent simply enjoys randomization.
With the other, "error-averse," choice rule, the agent dislikes adding inferior items to a menu; this corresponds to a representation with consideration costs based on menu size, and also to a representation where the agent has to expend e↵ort to avoid choosing the wrong item by accident. In this case the agent's choices satisfy a version of "set betweenness"as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) , and the agent is "variety averting", which we interpret as aversion to potential errors.
To motivate and explain our representations and results it is useful to recall several explanations from the literature for stochastic choice in static problems.
Random utility: Agents might maximize their expected utility given privately observed payo↵ shocks as in Thurstone (1927) , McFadden (1973) , and Harsanyi (1973a) , so that even choices that are typically unappealing could be optimal when the payo↵ shock is large. This is the starting point for the discounted logit model used in estimation 1 and corresponds to what we call the discounted logit representation (Definition 2), which as we show is flexibility preferring.
This paper provides axiomatic foundations for this model, and also proposes and axiomatizes a closely related error-averse alternative, discounted logit with menu costs (Definition 5). Inattention: Agents might randomize as the result of error or inattention under a cost of attending to the decision. Here, paying no attention results in a uniform error distribution, and the agent faces a cost of paying attention in order to increase the probability of the desired outcome. This explanation is explored in van Damme (1991) and van Damme and Weibull (2002) . This corresponds to our discounted relative entropy representation (Definition 7), which is equivalent to discounted logit with menu costs. Nonlinear preferences: Agents might maximize the sum of expected utility and a non-linear perturbation function that makes it optimal to assign positive probability to every action, as in Harsanyi (1973b) and Machina (1985) ; see also Swait and Marley (2013) . This corresponds to our discounted entropy representation (Definition 4). This sort of objective function is also analyzed in Fudenberg and Levine (1995) , Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) , Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005) , Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) , Fudenberg and Takahashi (2011) all of which focus on the case of repeated stochastic choice in static games. 2 One motivation for this paper is to extend that work to allow for dynamic considerations, such as would arise in learning to play an extensive-form game.
Weighting function: Finally, observed choices might be the result of psychophysical "weighting functions," as in Luce (1959) , who characterized stochastic choice in static problems under the additional assumptions of positivity (all actions have positive probability) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives or "IIA." Under these assumptions, the observed choice distribution can be generated by assigning weights w(z) to each action z, and then picking an action with probability equal to its share of the total weight. This corresponds to our discounted flexibility preferring Luce and discounted error-averse Luce representations (Definitions 10 and 11). In the static setting, there are well-known equivalences between the above explanations of stochastic choice. The Luce choice rule can equivalently be described by the choice rule that arises from a nonlinear preference where the agent maximizes the sum of expected utility u and a constant ⌘ times the entropy of the distribution. 3 This choice rule also corresponds to logit choice, meaning a random utility model where the payo↵ shocks are i.i.d. with extreme value type-1 distributions, see e.g. Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) . 4 Finally, it will 2 Fudenberg and Levine (1995) show that this generates a choice rule that is Hannan consistent, meaning that the decision makers gets at least the payo↵ that would be obtained from maximizing against the long-run average of play by Nature and and any other players (Hannan, 1957) . This property might be of interest to non-Bayesian agents who are not completely sure that the outcomes (or the map from actions to outcomes) will be as specified and so want to randomize to guard against malevolent choices by Nature.
3 The corresponding Luce weight on action z is w(z) = exp (u(z)/⌘). 4 They cite Choukroun (1975) as an early paper documenting the connection between entropy and logit.
be important in what follows that the same choice rule also arises from maximizing the sum of expected utility and a constant ⌘ times the relative entropy of the distribution of actions with respect to the uniform distribution, as this relative entropy is just the di↵erence between the entropy of the chosen action distribution and the entropy of a baseline distribution. Here, the baseline distribution corresponds to the action distribution if the agent does not pay attention, and the relative entropy corresponds to the cost of attending to decisions.
Our main goal is to better understand the issues involved in modeling an agent who makes random choices not only over actions with immediate consumption consequences but also over actions that can alter the choice sets that will be available in the future. An additional benefit of our approach is that the relationship between choices in various periods can help distinguish between interpretations and representations that are equivalent in the static setting. To make this first step in characterizing dynamic stochastic choice we maintain the IIA assumption throughout the paper. 5 Although this assumption is restrictive, and can make implausible predictions about the impact of adding utility-equivalent choices, we maintain it here to focus on the new issues that arise when modeling stochastic choice in a dynamic setting. 6 Also, one of our motivations is to axiomatize the widely used discounted logit model, which satisfies IIA.
Our axioms for the discounted logit model are: the IIA assumption (so that static choice is logit); an axiom that implies that preferences over future decision problems are independent of the outcome in the current period, and conversely, a separability axiom to arrive at the convenient discounted sum formulation; 7 and finally an "aggregate recursivity"axiom that says that a future choice problem A is more likely to be selected now than some other B if elements of A are more likely to be selected (in the aggregate) than elements of B when the union of these menus is presented as an immediate decision next period. The error-averse form uses the same axioms, except that aggregate recursivity is replaced by "average recursivity,"which says 5 There is a theoretical literature that characterizes the static stochastic choices that can be generated by general Harsanyi random-utility models without the IIA assumption (Falmagne, 1978; Barberá and Pattanaik, 1986; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) , and recent work by Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2012) that characterizes generalizations of nested logit, but there is not an analogous characterization of the stochastic choices consistent with the perturbed utility functions described in point 3) above. (Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) consider a related but di↵erent setting where whe size of the choice set is held fixed while the underlying utilities-which are known to the analyst-vary.)
6 The issue with utility-equivalents is not due to IIA but arises in any random utility model with independent shocks. A similar issue arises in nested-logit estimation, where adding similar alternatives makes some purchase more likely than the alternative "no purchase,"and in the limit of a very large set of goods almost everyone must purchase. Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) propose two alternative responses to this issue in a static model: either scale the variance of the extreme-value shocks with the number of goods in the menu, or add a term to the utility function that depends on various characteristics of the menu. This is similar in spirit to logit with menu costs representation, see Definition 5.
7 To arrive at the discounted-sum formulations requires assumptions that ensure that future periods enter into the value function in an additively separable way, and a further assumption is needed to ensure a constant discount factor; the conditions we use here parallel those of Koopmans (1960) and Fishburn (1970) .
roughly that menus are judged by their average as opposed to aggregate future attractiveness.
Each set of axioms leads to "recursive" representations that express the agent's choice at time t in terms of the utility of time-t outcomes and a continuation value. We give two equivalent versions of each representation. Aggregate recursivity leads to discounted logit or equivalently to maximizing the discounted sum of expected utility and a constant times the entropy of the selected distribution. 8 Average recursivity leads to a version of discounted logit with menu costs or equivalently to maximizing the discounted sum of expected utility and a constant times relative entropy.
A preference for flexibility-that is, for larger choice sets-arises in the discounted entropy representation from the fact that larger choice sets have a higher maximum entropy, and in the discounted logit specification from the fact that each new object added to a menu provides another chance for a good realization of the random shocks and has no downside as the wrong item will never be chosen by accident. In the error-averse discounted relative entropy representation, adding an equally-good item to a singleton menu has no e↵ect on the menu's value, as the agent will choose to randomize uniformly; in the associated discounted logit with menu costs representation, maximum utility is unchanged because the benefit of the additional random draw is exactly o↵set by a "menu" or "consideration" cost. In both of these error-averse formulations, though, adding inferior items can lower the menu's value; this can be seen as form of bounded rationality arising from costly attention.
As should be clear by now, this paper relates to several strands of the axiomatic decision theory literature, to foundational literature in game theory, and to empirical work on dynamic choice. We discuss these relationships in the concluding section, after we have developed our representations and the associated axioms.
Primitives
For any set S let K(S) be the collection of nonempty finite subsets of S, to be interpreted as the collection of possible choice problems. For any set S let (S) be the collection of probability measures on S with finite support. Let n := ({1, . . . , n}).
We assume that time is discrete, t = 0, 1, . . . , T with T finite. Let Z be the set of all oneperiod outcomes. 9 In any period t, an individual choice problem is called a menu; we denote period t menus by letters A t , B t , C t , . . . and the space in which all menus live by M t . The 8 The logit and entropy rules coincide in a dynamic choice setting because, as noted above, the choice probabilities in a static setting coincide, and additionally, the value functions are the same, a fact that does not have a choice counterpart in static settings.
9 Our richness axiom will imply that Z is infinite, but we do not assume any structure on this set; possible cases include: a subset of R (monetary payo↵s), or R n (consumption bundles or acts), and (R n ) (lotteries).
elements of the menu are called actions and are denoted by a t , b t , c t , . . .; the space in which all actions live is denoted by A t . We construct the set of dynamic choice problems recursively. Let A T := Z and M T := K(A T ); in period T actions are synonymous with one-period outcomes because in the terminal period there is no future, and period T menus are just collections of one-period outcomes. Now we define the possible menus and actions in earlier time periods by
Thus, an action a t at time t is a pair (z t , A t+1 ) of current outcome and time-t + 1 menu, while a menu A t at time t is a finite set of such actions. For notational convenience, we set M T +1 = ; and use the convention that Z ⇥ M T +1 = Z. It is important that the actions today can restrict future opportunities without having any impact on the current outcome; for example the agent might face the period T 1 menu
Moreover, the agent might face the choice at time T 3 of whether to commit to her time-T outcome in period T 2 or in period T 1 As we will see, our flexibility-preferring and error-averse representations predict di↵erent choices here; this is one advantage of allowing a general finite horizon as opposed to restricting the model to have only two time periods.
A dynamic stochastic choice rule is a collection of mappings {P t } T t=0 such that P
Representations
We will provide two sets of additively separable representations, the first set for what we call "flexibility-preferring" preferences and the second for preferences that are "error averse."
Paralleling past work on static stochastic choice, we will give several alternate representations for each sort of preference; some of these may be better suited for estimation while others may be more tractable in theoretical work.
Representations of Flexibility-Preferring Choice Rules
We will show that the following discounted-sum formulations are equivalent, and characterize their consequences for dynamic stochastic choice. Each of them has a "preference for flexibility" in the sense that even if a is preferred to b, the menu {a, b} is preferred to {a}. Definition 1. A random variable ✏ has the extreme value distribution with noise parameter ⌘, 
such that for all t = 0, . . . , T , all A t , and all a
where
a stationary representation is impatient i↵ < 1. In this representation, the ✏ terms correspond to payo↵ shocks that are observed by the decision maker but not by the analyst, as in static random utility models. 11 The noise parameters ⌘ t govern the variance of the payo↵ shocks-the higher value of ⌘ t , the more uniform the choice. Note that these payo↵ shocks apply to every action, just as they do under the "Assumption AS" or equation (3.7) of Rust (1994) . For example, if a consumer first decides how much canned tuna to buy and later decides how much to consume each day, payo↵ shocks apply to the purchase decision as well as to consumption. 12 Intuitively, the reason that these rules are flexibility-preferring is that each new object added to the menu provides another chance for a good realization of the random shock ✏. Note also that this is the simplest sort of discounted logit representation, as it does not include a state variable and assumes stationarity. These are often relaxed in empirical work, but we maintain them here to focus on the issues related to recursive choice.
Definition 3. For any q 2 n , let H(q) := P n i=1 q i log(q i ) be the entropy of q. Definition 4 (Discounted Entropy Representation). {P t } has a Discounted Entropy Representation if and only there exist ⌘ t > 0, surjective felicity functions v t : Z ! R, discount 11 Note that the agent does not know the realizations of future payo↵ shocks, so he is he is on an equal footing with the analyst when it comes to future. This simplifying assumption makes the model tractable and is the reason why it is used in estimation. A model with partial revelation of future payo↵ shocks requires computationally intensive numerical work, as it lacks a closed form solution, and the model where the agent knows all future shocks from from the outset predicts purely deterministic choice in some settings where this seems implausible-see the discussion in Section 3.3
12 We call this sort of payo↵ shocks "shocks to actions," as opposed to the case where payo↵ shocks apply only to a set of "immediate outcomes." Section 3.3 uses a simple example to highlight the di↵erence in the two formulations. factor t > 0, and value functions U t : A t ! R recursively defined by
such that for all t = 0, . . . , T and A
The representation is
Note that the entropy term H is non-negative, as are the ⌘ t ; for this reason the agent always at least weakly prefers larger choice sets as he can assign probability 0 to the added options. Note also that the entropy of the uniform distribution over n objects is log(n), which increases without bound in n; hence the agent will prefer a menu of many roughly similar objects to the singleton menu with just one of them. We elaborate on the consequences of this below.
Representations for Error-Averse Choice Rules
With the other kind of preferences we consider, the agent prefers a singleton menu to a larger menu formed by adding inferior choices. Such preferences provide indirect evidence that the random choices arise from errors, and we will interpret them that way. We show that the following two error-averse representations are equivalent, and characterize them in terms of the choices they generate.
Definition 5 (Discounted Logit with Menu Costs Representation). {P t } has a Discounted Logit with Menu Costs Representation i↵ there exist surjective felicity functions v t : Z ! R, a discount factor t > 0, and value functions U t : A t ! R recursively defined by
a stationary representation is impatient i↵ < 1. In this representation, choice is derived from value in exactly the same way as in the dis-counted logit representation, the di↵erence is that the value of a menu is decreasing in its size.
These preferences are error-averse even though each new object added to the menu provides another chance for a good realization of the random shock ✏ zt because of the constant ⌘ t log |A t+1 | that is subtracted from the overall value of the menu. Moreover, this constant is such that the agent is just indi↵erent about whether to add an equivalent item to a singleton menu, though this indi↵erence is easier to see in the next, equivalent, representation.
Definition 6. For any q 2 n , let R(q) := P n i=1 q i log(nq i ) be the relative entropy of q with respect to the uniform distribution.
Definition 7 (Discounted Relative Entropy Representation). {P t } has a Discounted Relative Entropy Representation if and only there is ⌘ T > 0 and U T : Z ! R and for t < T there exists ⌘ t > 0, surjective felicity functions v t : Z ! R, an discount factor t > 0, and value functions U t : A t ! R recursively defined by
With these preferences, the agent prefers removing the lowest-ranked item[s] from a menu, but is indi↵erent about whether an equally good item is added to a singleton menu: When presented with a menu of two equally good items, the agent will choose to randomize uniformly, so that the relative entropy term is 0, and the realized utility will thus be the same as from a menu with only one of those two items. This indi↵erence is consistent with our interpretation of stochastic choice as arising from error, but rules out preferences that incorporate only consideration costs based on the size of the menu. As the equivalent logit representation suggests, though, the error-averse preferences are consistent with a combination of consideration costs based on menu size and logit-type payo↵ shocks.
Illustrative Examples Work or College?
To illustrate these choice rules, consider the following example of a high school student's choice of whether or not to go to college, which we adapt from Train (2009, Chapter 7) . There are two periods: the college years and the post-college years. In period 0 the student can either go to college, which gives immediate payo↵ v(c), or take a job and work instead, which gives immediate payo↵ v(w). Her choices in period 0 have consequences for the sets of options available in period 1: If the student works in period 0, there will be only one job available for her in period 1 (job z), which gives her a payo↵ of v(z), and if the student goes to college in period 0, she will choose between two jobs x and y with payo↵s v(x) and v(y). Thus, the student faces the decision depcited in Figure 1 . To represent this decision tree as one of our dynamic choice problems, let A 1 = {x, y} and B 1 = {z} be the two possible continuation problems in period 1 (after choosing to go to college or not). Then the time zero choice problem is
|A 0 ] to denote the probability that the student chooses to go to college in period 0 and P 1 [x|A 1 ] to denote the probability that in period 1 (conditional on having gone to college) the student chooses a job x.
Under the discounted logit model of stochastic choice (Definition 2), the value of the contin- y) and the probability of choosing job x from A 1 is
+e v(y) , where both formulas follow from the assumption that all ✏ ⇠ iif EV (1) and the well known "log-sum" representation of the logit value function (see, e.g., Train, 2009, Chapter 3, or Lemma 4 in the Appendix). Thus, the student goes to college
. The probability that the student will go to college thus equals
.
The calculation for the discounted entropy model, Definition 7, (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix) leads to identical choice probabilities. On the other hand, the discounted logit with menu costs model assigns value log e v(x) + e v(y) log 2 < log e v(x) + e v(y) to A 1 but assigns the same value to B 1 as in discounted logit. Thus the probability that the student will go to college is lower when menu costs are present because the option value that the choice set A 1 carries is smaller. An extreme case is when
while under discounted logit with menu costs
Thus the logarithmic correction term in the menu-costs representation exactly o↵sets the value of adding an equally good choice to the menu.
Shocks to Actions versus Shocks to Consumption
As noted above, discounted logit assigns shocks to all actions, even those without any immediate payo↵ consequences. One obvious alternative would be to suppose that shocks are only to consumption, while maintaining the assumption that the shocks are iid. 13 To understand the consequences of this alternative, suppose that the decision maker chooses x with probability .51 from the menu {x, y}. What will the decision maker do if asked to make the choice between x and y one period before they can be consumed? A model with payo↵ shocks on actions (such as discounted logit, with or without menu costs) or one with a benefit from randomization (such as the entropy representations) will generate stochastic choice for next period's consumption. However, a model with iid shocks to consumption predicts deterministic choice, regardless of the period length; this stark conclusion strikes us as a significant drawback. 
Axioms
We present the axioms in three subsections. The axioms in the first subsection simply ensure that preferences reduce to the logit case in a static problem and that preferences are independent of any fixed continuation problem, which also implies that preferences over today's outcomes with a fixed continuation problem reduce to logit. The second subsection develops two alternative axioms that relate choices at times t and t + 1; one axiom implies that the agent is flexibility-preferring while the other implies the agent is error-averse. These axioms are sufficient to obtain recursive representations of the preferences, i.e., representations that express choice at time t in terms of the utility of time-t outcomes and a continuation value. (The equivalence between such representations and these axioms is established in the Appendix.) However, just as in deterministic dynamic choice (Koopmans (1960) and Fishburn (1970) ), discounted representations require an additional separability assumption to ensure that the representation has the necessary additive separability. The discounted representations introduced above correspond to the condition "ordered ratios" that we introduce in the third subsection, along with the assumptions that characterize stationarity and impatience.
Logit-esque Axioms
Axiom 1 (Positivity). For any t, AAs argued by McFadden (1973) , a zero probability is empirically indistinguishable from a positive but small probability, and since keeping all probabilities positive facilitates estimation, the positivity axiom is usually assumed in econometric analysis of both static and dynamic discrete choice. In settings where the stochastic term arises from utility perturbations, positivity corresponds to the assumption that the utility perturbations have su ciently large support that even a typically unattractive option is occasionally preferred. Positivity is implied by perturbed objective function representation for stochastic choice; it is motivated there by the fact that no deterministic rule can be Hannan (or "universally") consistent.
, whenever the probabilities in the denominators are both positive.
Stage IIA says that the "choice ratio"-that is, the ratio of choice probabilities between two actions, does not depend on other actions in the menu; it reduces to the standard IIA axiom in period T by our assumption that choices do not depend on past history. Notice that positivity and IIA imply that the stochastic preference % t is transitive (see, e.g., Luce, 1959) . As is well known, this axiom is very restrictive. As we noted in the Introduction, it and the closely related logistic choice rule are widely used in empirical work for reasons of tractability. Assuming IIA lets us focus on other aspects of stochastic dynamic choice; we discuss some of the issues related to relaxing this assumption in Section 8.
Our primitive is a dynamic stochastic choice rule {P t } T t=0 . The notion of stochastic preference %t we define induced stochastic preferences on Z and M t+1 as follows: z is stochastically preferred to w at time
) for any outcome z 2 Z. Note that the induced relations % t are always transitive. Axiom 3 below will imply that they are complete. Anticipating that, we define the strict stochastic preference t and stochastic indi↵erence ⇠ t as the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % t . Axiom 3 (Ordinal Time Separability). For all t < T , z, z 0 2 Z, and
) This axiom says that preferences over future decision problems are independent of the outcome in the current period, and conversely that preferences over current outcomes do not depend on the choice problem to be confronted tomorrow. 15 It is thus a stochastic version of Postulate 3 of Koopmans (1960) , and corresponds to what Fishburn (1970, Chapter 4) calls independence. Axiom 3 together with either of the recursivity axioms of Section 4.2 is su cient for a history-independent recursive representation of the agent's preferences (see Theorems 5 and 6 in the Appendix.) 16 Notice that as its name suggests Axiom 3 applies only to the the ordinal stochastic preference; it does not require that the numerical values of the choice probabilities be equal. As in the case of deterministic choice, additively separable representations require stronger forms of independence. Our Axioms 8 and 12 strengthen Axiom 3 by ensuring the preservation of numerical values of choice probabilities.
We use the following richness axiom, which is slightly weaker that the Strong Richness axiom of Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2012) . It implies that the set of choice probabilities is convex-ranged and (by taking = 1) that for each outcome z in each period t there are countably many "equivalents" of z. We use this in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 where it helps us obtain additive time-separability and uniqueness.
Axiom 4 (Richness). For any t  T , action (z t , A t+1 ) 2 Z ⇥ M t+1 , finite set of outcomes Z
Tying Choices in Di↵erent Time Periods
Now we introduce several axioms that relate choices in consecutive time periods. We have two reasons for interest in these axioms. One is the normative idea that the decision maker should 15 Since at least one reader asked us whether Axioms 1 and 2 imply Axiom 3, we point out that Axiom 3 fails if preference has logistic choice with the following specification:
) for some functions u and v.
16 Axiom 3 could be relaxed to allow time-t preferences to depend on past choices only through an observed state variable, as in many empirical applications, see, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) . For example, even without Axiom 3, Axioms 1, 2 and 6 imply a history-dependent form of the "Recursive Logit" representation obtained in Theorem 5. Some of the empirical literature uses state-dependent preferences to capture the way current actions can influence future menus while holding the nominal set of actions constant: Instead of making an action infeasible, its utility is set to be minus infinity, as in Train (2009, Chapter 7) . We do not need to use this modeling device, because we have explicitly modeled the way current actions influence future menus. Modeling history-dependent menus via payo↵s seems innocuous in the usual discounted logit setting, but it does not make sense with error-averse preferences, as can be seen by considering discounted logit with menu costs.
base his choice of menus on the attractiveness of the menus' contents, which is reflected by the probabilities these contents are selected in the next period. The other motivation is to better understand the representations of Section 3, which imply all of the axioms of this subsection.
The least restrictive and perhaps simplest way to link consecutive decisions compares two binary choice problems: one at time t where both options involve the same instantaneous payo↵ and di↵er only in the future, and the other at time t + 1 where both options are exactly the continuations of the options from the period t choice problem. The axiom requires that the stochastic preference between these two options is the same.
Axiom 5 (Singleton Recursivity). For all t < T , and singleton menus
Notice that Singleton Recursivity is a form of monotonicity: raising the t + 1 choice probability of an action makes the singleton choice set more attractive at time t. 17 However, Axiom 5 may not be as restrictive as it seems at first because it only pins down the period t preference on singleton continuation menus. Now we turn to axioms that consider choices between menus of di↵erent sizes. The next axiom says that future choice problem A is more likely to be selected now than some other B if elements of A are more likely to be selected than elements of B when both are presented as an immediate decision next period. The axiom might at first seem to require no more than that the agent is sophisticated, as it is a stochastic version of the temporal consistency axiom of Kreps and Porteus (1978) , which requires that a future choice problem A is selected now over some other B if there exists an element of A which is selected over any element of B when both are presented as an immediate decision next period. 18
Axiom 6 (Aggregate Recursivity). For all t < T and menus
This axiom is satisfied by the discounted flexibility preferring logit choice rule. A one-line proof shows it implies the following stochastic version of Kreps (1979) ' Preference for Flexibility. 17 The following monotonicity condition applies to nonsingleton menus. This axiom rules out time-t preferences that evaluate menus only by their most or least preferred component.
Axiom (Monotone Recursivity). Let {a 1 t+1 , . . . , a n t+1 } and {â
The axiom is also similar to Koopmans' Postulate 4, which combines the requirement of stationarity with dynamic consistency.
Axiom (Preference for Flexibility). For all t < T and menus
Proposition 1. Axiom 6 implies Preference for Flexibility. Moreover, in the presence of Axiom 1, a strict version of Preference for Flexibility is implied.
As we show in Propositions 3,4, and 6, this preference for flexibility implies (in the presence of our other maintained assumptions) that the agent has a preference for adding equivalents and near equivalents to a menu, and for making decisions early. The discounted logit and entropy representations satisfy aggregate recursivity and hence have a preference for flexibility.
The error averse logit and entropy representations introduced above satisfy all of the same axioms as the flexibility-prefering ones, except for Axiom 6. Instead of that axiom, they satisfy the following condition, which says that choice problem A is more likely to be selected now then some other B if the average of the choice probabilities of elements of A is higher than that of B when the choice set tomorrow is the union of A and B.
Axiom 7 (Average Recursivity). For all t < T and menus
The axiom is especially easy to understand when A t+1 is a singleton that is disjoint from B t+1 . In this case it says that the singleton menu A t+1 is preferred if next period its element is selected with greater than uniform probability (greater than 1/(1 + |A
. The axiom rules out preference for flexibility of Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) , and implies a form of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) 's Preference for Commitment: Given any A t+1 with more than one element, the agent strictly prefers the subset
The axiom also implies the following stochastic version of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) Set Betweenness:
Axiom (Disjoint Set Betweenness). For all t < T and disjoint menus
Proposition 2. Axiom 7 implies Disjoint Set Betweenness.
The aggregate and average recursivity conditions can be seen as special cases of more general "↵-recursivity" that penalizes larger choice sets by dividing the choice probabilities by |X| ↵ . 19
19 Formally, the preferences are ↵-recursive if there is ↵ 2 [0, 1] such that for all t < T and
Several of our representation results extend to ↵-recursivity, but as we do not have motivation or intuition for the more general representations, we have chosen not to include them.
Additivity, Stationarity, and Impatience
The axioms we have stated so far are su cient for the recursive representations presented in the Appendix, but to pin things down to the discounted form, we need to add a strong separability condition that ensure preferences are additively separable over time.
Axiom 8 (Ordered Ratios). For any
ensures that for any two pairs of period t + 1 actions their choice ratios are ordered in the same way in period t + 1 as in period t provided that in time t the immediate outcome is the same in each pair. This implies, among other things, that the period t choice ratio of two time t + 1 actions does not depend on the (shared) immediate outcome. Note that the axiom does not imply that the choice ratio at t equals to the choice ratio at t + 1; instead it requires that the ordering of choice ratios be preserved.
To get a sense of why a condition like this is necessary for the logit and entropy representations, consider the discounted entropy representation with ⌘ = 1. Let t = T 1, so that the continuation menus A t+2 are absent. Then,
so the time-t choice ratio is independent of z t and depends on a T , b T only via their choice ratio. To obtain a stationary discounted model, we also need an axiom to ensure that the discount factor and felicity function are time invariant. The original form of stationarity introduced by Koopmans (1960) relies on an infinite horizon; we use a similar axiom of Fishburn (1970, Chapter 7) . The axiom is imposed the period zero preference on consumption streams (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z T ) that is induced from % 0 by appropriately defining
Another form of stationarity will be needed to guarantee that the noise parameter ⌘ is time invariant. The following axiom captures the necessary and su cient restrictions by ensuring that preferences over current-period outcomes are the same in every period.
Axiom 10 (Stationarity of Choices). For any z, z 0 2 Z, any A 1 2 M 1 , any t = 0, . . . , T and A t 2 M t we have
Finally, Impatience ensures that the discount factor is less than one.
Axiom 11 (Impatience). For any z, z v + for some 2 R.
Proof Sketch
Step 1: The first step in both proofs is Lemma 1, which shows that Axioms 1-3 are equivalent to a "sequential Luce representation": there are weights W t for actions a t such that
Here our maintained assumption that P t is history independent and Axioms 1 and 2 let us use Luce's original argument to conclude there are weights that describe period-t choice, and Axiom 3 then lets us mimic the proof of Koopmans' Proposition 3 and conclude that
, where G t is a strictly increasing function of the felicity v t (z t ) and "anticipated utility" h t (A t+1 ).
Step 2: The representation in Step 1 is not recursive, as there need not be a link between actual choice in period t + 1, and the "anticipated utility" of A t+1 in period t, h t (A t+1 ). The aggregate and average recursivity conditions are alternate ways of providing this link, and each leads to representations evaluate the continuation problem with an aggregator that depends on anticipated future payo↵, as in Koopmans (1960) , Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Epstein and Zin (1989) , and Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) . Theorem 5 in the Appendix shows that Axioms 1-3 plus the Aggregate Recursivity assumption (Axiom 6) implies that preferences have a "recursive flexibility-preferring Luce" representation, where the weight assigned to (z t , A t+1 ) in period t, depends on the weights that will be used in period t + 1 according to
The equivalence of this representation with the recursive flexibility-preferring entropy and logit representations then follows from the static equivalence of these representations and a recursion argument. For Theorem 6, we use Average Recursivity (Axiom 7) to prove an analagous equivalence with a recursive error-averse Luce representation, and from there prove equivalences with the related relative entropy and logit with menu costs forms.
Step 3: The final step is to use Axioms 4 and 10 to pin down the discounting form. The separability condition of Axiom 10 implies that the recursive Luce weights satisfy
where for any z and > 0, z is the prize whose existence is guaranteed by the richness condition (Axiom 4) and has the property that
From there we obtain a functional equation that implies the desired result; the richness condition of Axiom 4 ensures that Axiom 10 has enough bite to imply the desired conclusion.
Behavioral Properties of the Model

Equivalents
In this section we show how the Aggregate and Average Recursivity axioms di↵er in their predictions about the impact of adding equivalent choices to the menu; here we do not use the discounted form of the model and only rely on Axioms 1-3.
Definition 9. We say that outcomes z and z 0 are equivalent at time t i↵ z ⇠ t z 0 . 20 We say that z and z 0 are ✏-equivalent at time t, denoted z ⇠ ✏ t z 0 if for some
The richness assumption guarantees there are equivalents and ✏ equivalents for each outcome. We now show that Aggregate Recursivity (plus Axioms 1-3) implies the agent is "variety loving"while Average Recursivity (and the same previous axioms) implies the agent is "variety averse." By this we mean the following: suppose that in period t + 1 z 2 , z 3 , . . . are equivalent to z 1 . Then Axiom 6 combined with Axioms 1-3 implies the agent is variety loving in the sense that for any menu A t+1 , a menu of su ciently many equivalents of any given outcome z 1 is preferred to A t+1 . On the other hand, under Axioms 1-3 and 7 the agent is variety averse, in the sense that if z t+1 y t+1 z 1 then {y} t {z, z 1 , z 2 , ...z n } for large enough n. Moreover, these results extend to ✏-equivalents if ✏ is small enough.
Proposition 3. Under Axioms 1-3 and 6 1. For any sequence of time t + 1 equivalents z 1 , z 2 , . . ., any menu A t+1 2 M t+1 , and any continuation menu C t+2 2 M t+2 for n su ciently high {(z 1 , C t+2 ) . . . , (z n , C t+2 )} t A t+1 .
2. Fix ✏ < 1. For any sequence of time t+1 ✏-equivalents z 1 , z 2 , . . ., any menu A t+1 2 A t+1 , and any continuation menu C t+2 2 M t+2 for n su ciently high {(z 1 , C t+2 ) . . . , (z n , C t+2 )} t A t+1 . Proposition 4. Under Axioms 1-3 and 7, 1. For any sequence of equivalents z 1 , z 2 , . . . at time t + 1, and any continuation menu
. . , (z n , C t+2 )} for all n and {(y, C t+2 )} t {(z, C t+2 ), (z 1 , C t+2 ), . . . , (z n , C t+2 )}} for n su ciently high. 2. If z t+1 y t+1 z 1 , then there is an✏ such that for any sequence of outcomes with z 1 ⇠ ✏ t+1 z i for some ✏ <✏ and all i, and any continuation menu
. . , (z n , C t+2 )}} for n su ciently high.
Indi↵erence to Distant Consequences
In this section and the next we consider the impatient stationary representations of Theorems 1 and 2. Both the flexibility preferring and error averse forms of these rules imply that the agent becomes less concerned about a choice as its consequences recede into the future, which implies that choice over distant rewards is close to the uniform distribution. To see this, let A be a finite subset of Z. Suppose the agent will receive a fixed sequencez = (z 0 , z 1 , ..., z T 1 ) in periods 0 through T 1, and that the only non-trivial decision (non-singleton choice problem) that the agent faces is to decide in time 0 which e z T to receive at time T . In the formalism of the paper, the agent's time-0 decision problem is to choose between |A| di↵erent continuation problems, one for each element of A. Let A 0 := {(z 0 , z 1 , ..., z T 1 ,z T ) :z T 2 x} be the choice set at time 0 and let q T (z
be the choice probability of a given element. Proposition 5. For the stationary impatient entropy choice rule (equivalently the stationary impatient logit choice rule) as well as the stationary impatient relative entropy choice rule (equivalently the stationary impatient logit with menu costs choice rule) we have lim
Choosing When to Choose
Now we consider when the agent would like to make a choice from a given menu, with the outcome to be received at some later time. As we show, the flexibility-preferring representations imply a preference for early decision, while the error-averse representations imply a preference to postpone choice.
Let A be a finite subset of Z with a generic elementz T . Suppose that the agent must choose between a 0 = (z 0 , A 1 ) and b 0 = (z 0 , B 1 ) at time 0. Under either decision problem, he will receive the same sequence (z 1 , . . . , z T 1 ) in periods 0 through T 1. Under A 1 , he will face a choice in period 1 of which elementz T 2 X to receive at time T , while under B 1 he selects his time-T outcomez T 2 A in period T . Figure 3 shows a simple problem of this kind. We are interested in the choice ratio
which reflects the strength of the preference for making an early decision. Proposition 6. For the stationary impatient entropy choice rule (equivalently the stationary impatient logit choice rule) the choice ratio r T > 1 as long as |A| 2. Moreover, lim T !1 r T = |A| . Remark 1. Note that this preference for early choice holds even though the agent prefers larger menus and so satisfies the stochastic form of Kreps's (1979) "preference for flexibility." 21 This might at first seem surprising, as Kreps shows that such preferences over menus can arise when the agent is uncertain about his future preferences, and such uncertainty suggests the agent would prefer to delay the decision. Note, though, that Kreps' model is not rich enough to pose the question of when the agent would like to make a future selection from a menu of fixed size and that a preference for larger menus can arise for many other reasons, 22 and that the extensions of Kreps' model to dynamic choice in Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski, and Takeoka (2013) and Krishna and Sadowski (2012) impose additional assumptions on top of a preference for large menus to deduce a preference for late decision. 23 Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski, and Takeoka (2013) have an explicit "prefer to decide later" axiom; Krishna and Sadowski (2012) use various alternative assumptions about how the agent views continuation problems.
With the stationary entropy choice rule, the agent derives a benefit (measured by the entropy function) from the simple act of choice, and impatience implies the agent would like to receive this benefit as early as possible. With stationary logit preferences, the reason the agent prefers early resolution is that the payo↵ shocks ✏ t apply to pairs (z t , A t+1 ) of current action and continuation plan, and since the expected value of the shock of the chosen action is positive, the agent again prefers early choice. 24 Proposition 7. For the stationary impatient relative entropy choice rule (equivalently the stationary impatient logit with menu costs choice rule) the choice ratio r T  1 with equality if and only if all the elements of the set A are equivalents. Moreover, lim T !1 r T = 1. Remark 2. The intuition for this result is that impatient agents prefer to postpone losses, and with relative entropy preferences, the agent perceives the act of choice as a "bad"unless the choice distribution is uniform, i.e. unless the choices are equivalents. With the equivalent error-averse logit representation the implied menu costs again make choice a bad and so imply a preference for later choice.
Luce Representations
Discounted Luce Representations
Here we define discounted versions of the Luce representation. They are closely related to the entropy and logit representations introduced above but they have di↵erent time-separability properties. The Discounted Flexibility-Preferring Luce Representation extends Luce's static representation to dynamic settings in a way that implies a preference for flexibility.
Definition 10. A dynamic stochastic choice rule has a Discounted Flexibility-Preferring Luce Representation if and only there exist felicity functions v t : Z ! R ++ , a discount factor t > 0, and value functions W t : A t ! R ++ recursively defined by
24 As we noted earlier, our representations correspond to "shocks to actions" and not "shocks to consumption payo↵." Note that a model with independent shocks each period to the utility associated with the current outcome z would have the property that the period-t choice between two actions with identical period-t outcomes would be deterministic. To get stochastic choice one could allow the agent to receive imperfect signals of future payo↵s. We hope to consider such models in future work but it is not clear whether they will be tractable.
such that for all t, all A t , and all a t+1 2 A
This choice rule exhibits a preference for flexibility because the function W t+1 takes nonnegative values and it is independent of the particular menu opportunity set A t+1 ; hence, adding elements to the set A t+1 increases the value of the sum in expression (9). The Discounted Error-Averse Luce Representation extends Luce's static representation in a way that implies error aversion. 
such that for all t = 0, . . . , T , A t , and all a
Intuitively, this choice rule exhibits error aversion because adding elements to the set A t+1 can decrease the value of the average in expression (11).
Axiomatic Characterization of Luce Representations
These Luce representations do not satisfy the time-separability condition of Axiom 8; instead they satisfy the following separability condition.
Axiom 12 (Separable Di↵erences). For any t < T , any z, z 0 2 Z, and any four distinct
The key di↵erence between the logit and entropy representations on one hand and the Luce representations on the other is that with the Luce representation the terms v t (z t ) and W t+1 enter additively into the current choice probability, while with the entropy representation these terms enter multiplicatively. For this reason Axiom 12 is expressed in terms of di↵erences, while Axiom 8 is expressed in terms of ratios. C. The stationary representation is unique in the following sense: suppose that v, andv,ˆ are two representations of {P t }. Thenˆ = andv = ↵v for some ↵ > 0. Because the Luce representations satisfy di↵erent time-separability properties than Logit and Entropy, they are not equivalent in terms of choice behavior. However, there is a tight connection between them, which we formalize in Section A.1.5 of the Appendix. Roughly speaking, a choice rule has an additive Luce representation if and only if it also has a particular kind of non-additive entropy (or logit) representation, where the aggregation of the period t felicity and period t + 1 anticipated value is similar to that of Epstein and Zin (1989) . Similarly, a choice rule has an additively separable entropy (or logit) representation if and only if it also has a particular Epstein-Zin like Luce representation. In the special case where the only choice is at time 0, the additively separable Luce representation coincides with the non-separable Luce representation that is equivalent to discounted relative entropy. In general, though, these two Luce representations di↵er due to the non-linear aggregator in the non-separable representation.
One interpretation of the nonlinear aggregator is that the agent has a preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty a la Kreps and Porteus (1978) when it comes to the randomization in his own subsequent choices. A formally identical situation arises with the Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences which are additively separable over deterministic consumption streams and where the nonseparabilities arise only when randomizations (by nature) are involved.
The analogy with the Kreps-Porteus-Epstein-Zin preferences suggests that we should be able to determine whether the discounted relative entropy choice rule has a preference for or against delaying choice by looking at its alternative Epstein-Zin like representation, and particularly, the convexity of the aggregator function, as suggested by Theorem 3 in Kreps and Porteus (1978) . By inspecting equation (24) in Proposition 13 we notice that preference for late resolution of uncertainty will obtain if the function 7 ! exp(v
concave. Since in the stationary impatient model this function is concave we conclude that the preference for early decisions obtains, which is also confirmed by Proposition 6. Likewise, looking at equation (11) in the definition of discounted Luce preferences suggests that the choice rule will display indi↵erence to timing, as the corresponding function is linear in . This is indeed the case, as the following Proposition confirms. As in Section 6.3, we are interested in the choice ratio r T :=
Proposition 8. For the stationary impatient Error Averse Luce choice rule r T = 1. The analogy with the Kreps-Porteus-Epstein-Zin preferences is not helpful in determining the timing attitudes of the flexibility-preferring versions of our choice rules because they involve sums instead of expectations. Nevertheless we can study the timing properties of these choice rules directly, as in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. For the stationary impatient Flexibility Preferring Luce choice rule r T 1 with a strict inequality whenever |X| 2.
Summary and Discussion
This paper has provided axiomatic characterizations of two sorts of stochastic dynamic choice rules, namely flexibility-preferring and error-averse. As we saw, the key di↵erence between them is what form of recursivity axiom links together choices in di↵erent periods: flexibility-preferring choice rules correspond to aggregate recursivity, while error-averse choice rules satisfy average recursivity. We pointed out that flexibility-preferring impatient preferences have a preference for early decision, even though they also satisfy the stochastic form of Kreps (1979) 's preference for flexibility; while error-averse stationary preferences prefer to act later. This highlights the fact that a preference for larger menus can arise for many reasons. In addition, our results provide a foundation for the use of the discounted-logit-with-menu-costs representation in emprical work; it seems just as tractable as the usual discounted logit and may better describe behavior in at least some choice problems where the menu size varies.
The paper is related to quite a large number of papers, as it draws on and extends the literature on static stochastic choice pioneered by Luce (1959) and Harsanyi (1973a) , the literature on discounting representations of deterministic dynamic choice (notably Koopmans (1960) and Fishburn (1970) ), and the literature on choices over menus pioneered by Kreps (1979) .
The work of Falmagne (1978) , Barberá and Pattanaik (1986) , Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2012) provides axiomatic characterizations of static stochastic choice without the IIA assumption; this suggests that our dynamic representations could also be generalized beyond IIA, though obtaining a dynamic model that is both general and tractable seems challenging. 25 Furthermore, to do this we would first want to develop a parallel characterization of the static choice probabilities that can be generated when the entropy or relative entropy perturbation term is replaced by a more general function from the class or perturbations studied by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) ; this is the topic of ongoing research with Ryota Iijima. In recent years there have been several generalizations of Koopmans (1960) 's characterization to forms of "behavioral" dynamic choice, as in Jackson and Yariv (2010) and Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2011); introducing stochastic choice into those setups could be a useful tool for analyzing experimental results.
The most active related literature is that on choice between menus. Some of these papers develop representations motivated by "consideration costs" or "costs of thinking"; to the extent that this cost is increasing in the menu size it is related to our error-averse representations. Ergin and Sarver (2010) , following Ergin (2003) , develop a representation with a double maximization, in which "costly contemplation" corresponds to buying a signal about the second-period attractiveness of the various options. They motivate their assumptions with the idea that agents may prefer to make ex post choices and not a complete contingent plan; this motivation uses choice over lotteries of menus, which is not part of their formal model. Ortoleva (2011) does explicitly consider lotteries over menus. He develops a "cost of thinking" that resembles the consideration cost of Ergin and Sarver; one key di↵erence is that Ortoleva's agent ranks menus as if she expected to choose the best option from each of them, despite the fact that doing so requires costly thinking that might not be ex-post optimal.
Other recent papers on choice from menus are of interest here primarily for how they impose recursivity or dynamic consistency. Ahn and Sarver (2012) is perhaps closest, as like this paper it treats both initial choice of a menu and subsequent choice from it as observable. They use recursivity axioms to pin down a unique state space and probabilities in the two-stage menu choice model; their Axiom 1 is similar in spirit to our aggregate recursivity condition 6, but as stated it is vacuously satisfied given our positivity assumption. 26 Ahn and Sarver assume a preference for flexibility and so rule out temptation. Dekel and Lipman (2012) impose consistency between the first period choice of a menu and second period choice from a menu at the level of the representation, and use choices in the two periods to distinguish between "random GP" and "random Strotz" representations in cases where temptation is present. 27 Krishna and Sadowski (2012) provide two representations for a decision maker who is uncertain about his future utility in an infinite-horizon decision problem. Their stationarity axiom corresponds to our Axioms 3 and 9, but neither average nor aggregate recursivity is consistent with the indifference required by their "continuation strategic rationality" axiom though they do assume the agent prefers larger menus.
Finally, the menu-choice literature suggests interesting extensions of our work in addition to those already mentioned above: Specifically, one could try to model the stochastic choice of lotteries, and once the model can handle explicit exogenous uncertainty, one could then examine the way that agents respond to information. It would also be interesting to examine the empirical implications of dynamic logit preferences with menu costs; these logit preferences seem as tractable for estimation as the more conventional form.
27 They also show that the random Strotz model can accommodate the non-linear cost of self control introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and further analyzed by Levine (2011, 2012) and Noor and Takeoka (2010a,b) .
Appendix
A.1 Recursive Representations
In this section we study recursive representations a la Koopmans (1960) , Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Epstein and Zin (1989), and Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) . The representations we present here are also history-independent, but have fewer time-separability properties than a discounted sum, and therefore correspond to a shorter list of axioms. We use these representations as intermediate steps towards the main theorems. In addition, we notice that the di↵erence between the logit and entropy representations on one hand and the Luce representations on the other arise only when we also ask for time separability; in the more general setting considered here all three representations satisfy the same set of axioms.
A. 
such that for all A t and all a t 2 A
Definition 13 (Sophisticated Luce). {P t } has a Sophisticated Luce Representation if it has a Sequential Luce Representation with
A.1.2 Flexibility-Preferring Representations
Definition 14 (Recursive Flexibility-Preferring Luce). {P t } has a Recursive FlexibilityPreferring Luce Representation if it has a Sequential Luce Representation with
Definition 15 (Recursive Entropy). {P t } has a Recursive Entropy Representation if there is there exist parameters ⌘strictly increasing in both variables (on appropriately defined domains D t ) and value functions U t : A t ! R recursively defined by
such that for all A t , and all (z, 
such that
A.1.3 Error-Averse Representations Definition 17 (Recursive Error-Averse Luce). {P t } has a Recursive Error-Averse Luce Representation if and only it has a Sequential Luce Representation with 
such that 
such that for all A t , and all (z, A t+1 ) 2 A Proposition 10. {P t } has a Discounted Flexibility-Preferring Luce Representation i↵ it has a representation defined by
, where the functions U t are defined recursively by
⌘⌘
Proposition 11. {P t } has a Discounted Entropy Representation i↵ it has a representation defined by
. where the functions W t are defined recursively by
Proposition 12. {P t } has a Discounted Error-Averse Luce Representation i↵ it has a representation defined by
has a Discounted Entropy Representation i↵ it has a Representation defined by
, where the functions W t are defined recursively by
A.2 Useful Lemmas from the Literature
The next two lemmas are well known, see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992, Section 3.6) .
The following two lemmas are well known as well, see Train (2009, Chapter 3) . 
Lemma 5. Suppose that ✏ 1 , . . . , ✏ n are i.i.d. random variables with the extreme value distribution with noise level parameter ⌘. For any vector (x 1 , . . . ,
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
A.3.1 Su ciency
Step 1: Fixz 2 Z and define
. For any A T = {z 1 , . . . , z n } 2 M T , Axioms 1 and 2 imply that for all i, j = 1 . . . , n
where the last equality follows from Axioms 1 and 2; therefore equation (14) follows. For t  T we proceed analogously, to define W t (z, A t+1 ) that satisfies equation (14).
Step 2: Part (1) of Axiom 3 and Step 1 imply that for all z, z 0 2 Z and
Fixh 2 Rh t and define v t (z) := F t (z,h). Property (27) implies that for any h 2 Rh t there exists a strictly increasing function m h t : (14). To prove that the first part of Axiom 3 holds we need to show that
By formula (14) this is equivalent to
, where G t is increasing in its second argument, we know that
). To prove that the second part of Axiom 3 holds we need to show that
, where G t is increasing in its first argument, we know that
A.3.3 Richness
Fix an arbitrary element (z t , A t+1 ) 2 A t and let r := W t (z t , A t+1 ). For anyr 2 (0, 1) let :=r r . Axiom 4 implies that there exists (ẑ t , A t+1 ) 2 A t such that
Sincer was chosen arbitrarily, the conclusion follows.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
A.4.1 Proof of the implication (i) ) (ii)
By Lemma 1, {P t } has a sequential Luce representation with functions W t and G t . By (13),
t is strictly increasing in the second variable). This and Axiom 6 imply that for t < T
The two inequalities above define numerical representations of the same weak order on M t+1 ; thus, by appropriately transforming G t we can take h
A.4.2 Proof of the implication (ii) ) (i)
To prove that Axiom 6 holds notice that by formula (14),
], is equivalent to
). The conclusion follows since by formula (13)
⌘ , where the function G t is strictly increasing in the second variable.
A.4.3 Proof of the implication (ii) , (iii)
Suppose that {P t } has a Recursive Flexibility Preferring Luce Representation with W t , v t , and G t . By Lemma 2 and equation (14), the choice probabilities P t are the solution to max
⌘⌘ and applying Lemma 2 is equivalent to
which is equation (16) 
,
. Thus
A.6.2.3 Impatience
Given (31), and the stationarity of v and , the induced preference on consumption streams
Thus, Axiom 11 implies that (v(z) v(z 0 ))(1 ) > 0, which implies that < 1.
A.6.3 Proof of part C of Theorem 1
Suppose that v, , ⌘ and v 0 , 0 , ⌘ 0 represent a stationary {P t } Given (31) and stationarity, the induced preference on consumption streams is represented byz 7 ! P T t=0 t 1 v(z t ) and byz 7 ! P T t=0 0t 1 v 0 (z t ). Thus, given that both v and v 0 are surjective, the uniqueness result for additive representations, e.g., Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 of Fishburn (1970) 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 2 and Propositions 13 and 12
The proof parallels the entropy case invoking Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 2, replacing every H(q) with R(q) and every P Proof of statement 1. Fix an arbitrary menu A t+1 2 M t+1 . Let z 1 , . . . , z n , . . . be equivalents at time t + 1, and let B n t+1 = {(z 1 , C t+2 ), . . . , (z n , C t+2 )}. We need to show that there is an N such that B n t+1 t A t+1 for all n > N. Since z 1 ⇠ t+1 z i , Definitions 8 and 9 and Axiom 3 imply that (z 1 , C t+2 ) ⇠ t+1 (z i , C t+2 ), which by Definition 1 and Axiom 1 implies that , which for n large is smaller than 1 2 as desired.
A.8.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of statement 1: Fix a continuation menu C t+2 2 A t+2 . Let z 1 , z 2 , . . . be equivalents at time t + 1 and let B n t+1 = {(z 1 , C t+2 ) . . . , (z n , C t+2 )}. Let A t+1 = (z, C t+2 ) and let D t+1 = (y, C t+2 ). We need to show that if z t+1 y t+1 z 1 then A t+1 t B n t+1 for all n, and there exists N such that for n N, D t+1 t A t+1 [ B n t+1 . Let
Since z t+1 z 1 we know that k > 1, so from the proof of statement 1 of Proposition 3
Hence, by Axiom 7, A t+1 t B n t+1 for any n. For the second claim let
= > 1 and
= > 1. Then
which is equivalent to > 1 n+1 (n + ), which is true for su ciently large n because > 1.
Proof of Statement 2: Now let z 2 , z 3 , . . . be time t + 1-✏equivalents of z 1 with ✏ <✏, and let B n t+1 = {(z 1 , C t+2 ) . . . , (z n , C t+2 )}. Since
> 1 there is an✏ > 0 with
[ B n t+1 , and note that . To see that, observe that Axiom 7 implies
Rearranging this inequality and recalling that A t+1 and A 0 t+1 are disjoint, we obtain
which by Axiom 7 implies the first part of the conclusion.
Second, we prove.
. Observe that Axiom 7 implies that
which by Axiom 7 implies the second part of the conclusion.
